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A fall in house prices due to a change in fundamental value redistributes wealth from those long housing
(for whom the fundamental value of the house they own exceeds the present discounted value of their
planned future consumption of housing services) to those short housing.  In a representative agent
model and in the Yaari-Blanchard OLG model used in the paper, there is no pure wealth effect on
consumption from a change in house prices if this represents a change in fundamental value. There
is a pure wealth effect on consumption from a change in house prices if this reflects a change in the
speculative bubble component of house prices. Two other channels through which house prices can
affect aggregate consumption are (1) redistribution effects if the marginal propensity to spend out
of wealth differs between those long housing and those short housing and (2) collateral or credit effects
due to the collateralisability of housing wealth and the non-collateralisability of human wealth.  A
decline in house prices reduces the scope for mortgage equity withdrawal.  For given sequences of
future after-tax labour income and interest rates, this may depress consumption in the short run while
boosting it in the long run.
Willem H. Buiter
European Institute








The bold statement “Housing wealth isn’t wealth” was put to me about ten years ago by 
Mervyn King, now Governor of the Bank of England, then Chief Economist of the Bank of 
England, shortly after I joined the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England as an 
external member in June 1997. Like most bold statements, the assertion is not quite correct; the 
correct statement is that a decline in house prices does create a negative wealth effect on aggregate 
consumption demand.  On average, consumers are neither worse off nor better off. 
The argument is elementary and applies to coconuts as well as to houses. When does a fall 
in the price of coconuts make you worse off? Answer: when you are a net exporter of coconuts, that 
is, when your endowment of coconuts exceeds your consumption of coconuts.  A net importer of 
coconuts is better off when the price of coconuts falls. Someone who is just self-sufficient in 
coconuts is neither worse off nor better off.  
As regards wealth effects, houses are like durable coconuts, or indeed like any consumer 
durable.  The fundamental value of a house is the present discounted value of its current and future 
rentals, actual or (in the case of owner-occupiers) imputed.  Anyone who is ‘long’ housing, that is, 
anyone for whom the value of their home exceeds the present discounted value of the housing 
services they plan to consume over their remaining lifetime will be made worse off by a decline in 
house prices.  Anyone ‘short’ housing will be better off.  So the young and all those planning to 
trade up in the housing market are made better off by a decline in house prices.  The old and all 
those planning to trade down in the housing market will be worse off.  Another way to put this is 
that landlords are worse off as a result of a decline in house prices, while current and future tenants 
are better off.  On average, the inhabitants of a country own the houses they live in; on average, 
every tenant is his/her own landlord and vice versa.  So in a representative agent model, there is no 
net housing wealth effect.  You need a model with heterogeneous agents in which a change in house 
prices causes redistribution between agents with different marginal propensities to spend in order to 
get an aggregate wealth effect from a change in house prices. 2 
 
Most econometric or calibrated numerical models I am familiar with treat housing wealth just like 
the value of stocks and shares as a determinant of household consumption. Their designers appear to forget 
that households consume housing services (for which they pay or impute rent) but not stock or bond services. 
A prominent example is the FRB/US model (see Brayton and Tinsley, eds. (1996), Brayton, Levin, Tryon, 
and Williams (1997), and Brayton, Mauskopf, Reifschneider, Tinsley and Williams(1997)).  It is used 
frequently by participants in the debate on the implication of developments in the US housing market for US 
consumer demand. A recent example is Frederic S. Mishkin’s (2007) paper “Housing and the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism”. The FRB/US model a-priori constrains the wealth effects of housing wealth and 
other financial wealth to be the same. The long-run marginal propensity to consume out of non-human 
wealth (including housing wealth) is 0.038, that is, 3.8 percent.  
In several simulations, Mishkin increases the value of the long-run marginal propensity to 
consume out of housing wealth to 0.076, that is, 7.6 percent, while keeping the long-run marginal 
propensity to consume out of non-housing financial wealth at 0.038.  
The argument for an effect of a change in house prices on consumption other than the pure 
wealth effect, is that housing wealth is collateralisable. Households-consumers can borrow against 
the equity in their homes and use this to finance consumption. If they are credit-constrained, a boost 
to housing wealth would relax the credit constraint and temporarily boost consumption spending.  
Of course, the increased debt will have to be serviced, and eventually consumption will have to be 
below the level it would have been at in the absence of the mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW).  At 
market interest rates, the present value of current and future consumption will not be affect by the 
MEW channel.  
Ben Bernanke (2008), Don Kohn (2008), Fredric Mishkin (2007), Randall Kroszner (2007) 
and Charles Plosser (2007) all have made statements to the effect that the credit effect, collateral 
effect or MEW effect of a change in house prices is on top of, that is, in addition to, the ‘normal’ 
wealth effect.  The message of this paper is that the benchmark model should instead by one in 
which there is no pure wealth effect from a change in house prices and in which therefore the 
collateral effect is instead of, not in addition to, the normal wealth effect.  By overestimating the 3 
 
contractionary effect on consumer demand of the decline in house prices, the Fed may have been 
convinced to cut rates too fast and too far.   
The insight that housing wealth isn’t wealth has the status of a folk theorem in macro 
consumer demand theory and empirics (see e.g. Buchanan and Fiotakis (2004), Edelstein and Lum 
(2004), Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2006)).  A rigorous 
statement and formal model of the proposition is not, as far as I know, available.  The representative 
agent special case of the model presented in this paper can be found in the Appendix to Buiter 
(2008). 
 
1. The model  
Individual household behaviour 
  For sake of brevity, I consider an integrated household-consumer-home owner-construction 
firm, rather than the separate household and business entities.  The structure of preferences is 
irrelevant to the result, as long utility is increasing in consumption of housing services and 
consumption of non-housing goods and services.  What matters for the result are first the 
assumption of housing autarky for the economy under consideration and second the absence of life-
cycle-related effects on the demand for housing services.   
Housing autarky means that there are no foreign owners of domestic housing.  As regards 
age-related variations in the demand for housing services, in the Yaari-Blanchard OLG model used 
in what follows (for expositional simplicity), every surviving household has the same remaining life 
expectancy, regardless of the age of the household (see Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1985) and Buiter 
(1988)).  In addition, the current housing stock and the all future contributions to the flow of rental 
income from housing are fully owned by those currently alive.  This is in contrast to human capital, 
where the future wages earned (net of taxes on labour income paid) by the unborn are not owned by 
any private agent currently alive today.  This is a consequence of the implicit assumption of the 
absence of hereditary slavery.  When combined with the assumption of no (operative) 4 
 
intergenerational gift and bequest motive, it generates absence of debt neutrality in the Yaari-
Blanchard OLG model as in the Allais-Samuelson OLG model. From the perspective of the 
ownership of financial assets (as opposed to the ownership of human capital), the Yaari-Blanchard 
OLG model is, however, like a representative agent model.  There are therefore no redistributional 
effects from house price changes.  Combined with the assumption of housing autarky (there is no 
foreign ownership of the housing stock), this means that any equilibrium is indistinguishable from 
an equilibrium in which every household always consumes its own endowment of housing services. 
  Once born, each household has a constant, age-independent instantaneous probability of. 
dying,  0 µ ≥ .  The birth rate,  0 β ≥ , is constant. With  0 β =  the model reduces to the 
representative agent model, regardless of whether µ  is positive or zero.  At time t a surviving 
household born at time vt ≤  earns an exogenous wage income  (, ) 0 wts ≥  (for simplicity, each 
household’s labour supply is assumed inelastic and scaled to unity), pays lump-sum taxes  (, ) tv τ , 
consumes an amount of non-housing goods and services  (, ) 0 ztv≥ , and an amount of housing 
services  (, ) 0 tv ρ ≥ .  The rest of its income is either saved in the form real financial assets earning 
the instantaneous risk-free real interest rate  () rt plus a competitive annuity rate (to be discussed) or 
spent on acquiring housing equity at a price  ( )
k p t  for an ownership claim to one unit of physical 
housing capital.  Here  (, ) ktvis the number of housing shares owned by generation v at time t.  A 
unit of real housing capital earns real rental income or dividend  () x t .  Real financial wealth held by 
the household, excluding the value of the stock of housing it owns, is denoted f(t,v).  Non-housing 
goods and services are the numéraire.  The price of a unit of housing services in terms of non-
housing goods and services is  () pt . 
  There are efficient competitive annuities markets.  Surviving households earn an annuity 
premium rate r
A on their non-human wealth (including housing wealth).  When a household dies, all 
its non-human wealth (which can be negative) accrues to the life-insurance company that has sold 
them the annuity.  There is free entry into the annuities market; therefore r µ =
A .   5 
 
A utility-maximising competitive representative household born at time vt ≤  and having 
survived until time t, maximizes the time-additive objective function in (1) subject to the 
instantaneous budget identity (2) and the solvency constraint (3). The expectation operator 
conditional on information at time t is  t E , θ  is the subjective rate of pure time preference and σ  is 
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It follows that the instantaneous budget identity can be rewritten as: 
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  The only uncertainty in the model is uncertain life expectancy, if the probability of death µ  
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Let the present discounted value of current and future after-tax labour income or human 
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The solvency constraint (3), the instantaneous budget identity (2) and (7) permit us to write 
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The first-order conditions for housing and non-housing consumption imply that, for all 
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  () r λ µλ =− +    (12) 
Here  (, ) tv λ  is the co-state variable of real private non-human wealth at time t for a household born 
at time v (measured in units of utility), whose equation of motion is given in (2), that is, the present 
value shadow price for a household of generation v of private financial wealth and housing wealth.   
From equations (8) to (12), we can obtain the following individual decision rules for 
consumption or consumption functions.  Total consumption of both housing services and non-
housing goods and services is denoted cp z ρ = + : 
  (, ) ( 1 )() z tv ct η = −  (13) 
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where  () t ξ , the marginal propensity to consume out of comprehensive wealth, is independent of 
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Equations (2), (7), (8) (holding with equality) and (15) imply: 
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For the logarithmic instantaneous felicity function  1 σ = , this simplifies to  
  () t ξ ξθµ = =+ (18) 
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Aggregation 
For any individual household flow or stock variable  (, ) ytv we define the population 
aggregate  () Yt as follows: for  0 β > , 
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where  (, ) Stv is the number of households born at time v that are still alive at time t.  Let  () 0 Ot >  
be the size of the population (the size of the labour force or the number of households) at time t. 
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I also assume that you are born just with your endowment of human wealth – there are no 
intergenerational gifts and bequests – and therefore: 
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It follows that each surviving member of every generation has the same human wealth: 
  (, ) () htv ht =  (28) 
The aggregate consumption function is given by: 
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  If follows that the aggregate consumption ‘Euler equation’ is given by: 
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With the logarithmic utility function,  1 σ = , the aggregate consumption Euler equation 
simplifies to: 9 
 
  ()( ) ()
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The accumulation of housing capital 
  There is a continuum of competitive home construction firms on the unit circle who 
maximize profits by accumulating housing capital and letting it out.  Each firm maximises the 
following objective function: 
()
()
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subject to the constraint that the resource cost of housing capital formation is quadratic in the 
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and the capital stock adjustment identity 
  KI K δ =−   (38) 
Here  0 γ ≥  measures the severity of the housing capital adjustment costs and  0 δ ≥  is the constant 
proportional deprecation rate of the stock of housing capital.  When γ →∞ we have the case of 
unaugmentable capital.  When γ →∞ and  0 δ =  we have the case of housing as ‘land’ in the sense 
of the unaugmentable and indestructible contribution of nature.  When γ  is positive but finite, the 
housing stock is fixed in the short run but augmentable in the long run.  
Note that, unlike its owners, this enterprise does not die.  Its discount rate is therefore the 
risk-free real interest rate, without the annuity premium added (see Buiter (1989).  The production 
function for housing services is assumed to be linear in the capital stock and is given by  () () sKs α . 
  The first-order conditions for an optimum imply that optimal investment is governed by 
equations (39) and (40):   
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The shadow price of the capital stock (the current value co-state variable of  () Kt in (38), is 
Tobin’s ‘marginal q’.  The market value of the equity held in the construction companies is also 
given by (36). 
Because the investing firm is assumed to be a price taker, and because the production 
function of housing services is linear in the capital stock and the investment adjustment cost 
function is linear homogeneous in the investment rate and the capital stock, Tobin’s marginal q also 
equals Tobin’s average q, which is the fundamental value of a unit of installed housing capital.   
This result, first established by Hayashi (1982), implies that 
  () () () Vt qtKt =  (42) 
The intuition is, as stated in Hayashi (1982), that average Tobin’s q (and marginal Tobin’s q) are 
independent of the initial capital stock if the production and installation functions are linear 
homogeneous and if the firm is a price-taker.  
I write the market value of a unit of installed housing capital as 
 
k p qb = +  (43) 
The first term on the RHS of (43) is the fundamental value of a unit of installed housing, defined by 
(40) and (39), that is, its shadow price. When 
k p  is interpreted not as a shadow price in a dynamic 
optimisation problem, where the boundary conditions for optimality ensure that the shadow price 
supports the optimum (that is,  () 0 bt = ), but rather as an asset market price set in a market where 
there is no invisible transversality-condition-imposing hand, there can also be a bubble term b(t) in 
(43).  If the bubble is (myopically) rational, then 
  ( ) br b δ =+   (44) 11 
 
The competitive rental rate for housing services, x, earned by households as dividends from 
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Equilibrium in the housing market or housing autarky 
We now impose economy-wide equilibrium in the housing market: 
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  The key point to note is that the aggregate intertemporal budget constraint (47) does not 
depend on the fundamental value of the current housing stock, qK .  Housing variables enter the 
budget constraints only through the cost of future investment in housing, Λ, and through the bubble 
term in the house price equation, if there is one, bK . 
  Once we impose the housing market equilibrium or housing autarky condition, given by the 
first equality in (46), we can rewrite the three consumption functions in the following manner: 
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Equation (53) constrains the bubble and/or the housing investment process.  If the bubble is rational 
that is, it satisfies the homogeneous equation of the equation of motion driving the fundamental valuation q, 
as given by equation (44), it follows that either there is no bubble,  () 0 bt =  or gross housing investment is 
zero,  () 0 It= .  


















  NFb K = +− Λ   (55) 
  (1 ) Nr NWT C η =+ − − −   (56) 









Ht e Ws Ts d s
β
∞
−+ ∫ =− ∫   (57) 
The presence of the birth rate as an augmentation factor for the discount rate applied to future 
aggregate after-tax labour income is due to the assumption, built into the model, that the human wealth of 
future generations is not owned by anyone currently alive.  This assumption about property rights 
(effectively the absence of hereditary slavery), together with the assumption that there are no operative 
intergenerational gift and bequest motives, makes for the absence of debt neutrality that is a property of all 
OLG models that make the same two key assumptions.   
 13 
 
2. The pure wealth effect of house price changes on consumption 
  The OLG structure does not destroy the absence of wealth effects from a change in house prices, 
because the aggregate demand for housing services is not affected by a change in the distribution of wealth 
between the young and the old.  If there were age-specific propensities to consume housing services, this 
would not in general be the case.   











Note that  ( ) ( ) tL t Λ=  if and only if  0 β = . This is because ( ) t Λ  is the present discounted value at 
time t of the real resource cost of current and future investment in housing by all generations 
currently alive and yet to be born, all of which is reflected in the forward-looking valuations of the 
existing housing stock, while  () L t  is just the present discounted value of the real resource cost of 
current and future housing investment by all generations currently alive (see footnote 2). 
It is clear from equations (49), (50), (51) and (52) that, provided there is no housing bubble 
( () 0 bt = ), current aggregate consumption of housing services plus non-housing services  ( ) Ct is 
independent of the value of the current housing stock, 
k p K .  In other words, consumption is 
independent of the fundamental value of the housing stock,  () () q tKt.  Likewise, current 
consumption of housing services,  () () p tRt is independent of the value of the current housing stock, 
and so is aggregate consumption of non-housing goods and services,  () Z t . 
The present discounted value of the real resource cost of future investment in housing  ( ) t Λ , 
given in equation (48) may of course be affected by the same factors that cause a change in the 
value of the existing housing stock, but that is a quite separate matter from a wealth effect on 
consumption of a change in the value of the existing housing stock.  This effect of house prices on 
investment in housing is recognized through the housing investment function, given in equation 
(39), which makes gross housing investment an increasing function of Tobin’s q.  So  ( ) t Λ  is a 
function not of the current price of housing capital but of the sequence of future (expected) prices of 
housing capital. 14 
 
I summarise this as a Proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: In the Yaari-Blanchard OLG model, a change in the fundamental value of a unit of 
installed housing,φ , has not wealth effect on aggregate consumption demand, the demand for 
housing services or the consumption demand for non-housing goods and services. 
 
It also follows immediately from the consumption functions in (49), that the following holds: 
 
Proposition 2: In the Yaari-Blanchard OLG model, a change in the bubble component of the price 
of a unit of installed housing, b, is associated with a wealth effect on aggregate consumption 
demand, on the demand for housing services and on the consumption demand for non-housing 
goods and services.  
 
Why the common error? 
How did so many of students of consumption behaviour and wealth effects miss the obvious 
point of Proposition 1? 
The most likely reason is that the standard consumption function is the decision rule of an 
individual, or an aggregation of such individual decision rules.  When studying consumption 
behaviour, equilibrium conditions are not normally imposed on these decision rules.  On the whole 
this is good practice – the fact that prices and economy-wide aggregate quantities taken as 
parametric by individuals are in fact endogenously determined by the interaction of these price-
taking economic agents, does not mean that it is not helpful to treat individual decision rules and 
equilibrium conditions conceptually distinct.  But when we deal with general equilibrium responses 
to policies or shocks, the equilibrium conditions do of course have to be imposed.  This was 
obviously not done in such papers as Mishkin (2007).  
Without imposing the (‘in the aggregate, you own the house you rent’ or ‘housing autarky’ 
assumption (46) and using equations (36), (42) and (43), total consumption, non-housing 
consumption and housing consumption can, respectively, be written as in equations (29), (30) and 
(31) respectively, that is, as functions of total non-human wealth, 
k Fp K +  and human wealth, H , 
and with the equations of motion for non-human wealth and human wealth given by (32) and (33) 15 
 
respectively.  In this version of the consumption function, non-housing financial wealth, F  and 
housing wealth 
k p K  enter with the same marginal propensities to spend, ξ . 
 The  equation  ()
k CF p K H ξ =++ is the standard ‘permanent income’ consumption 
function where aggregate consumption is proportional to the sum of aggregate non-human and 
human wealth, and where aggregate non-human wealth includes the value of the housing stock on 
the same terms as other non-human wealth.  However, when we impose the housing autarky 
assumption, that same consumption function can be written as  ()
1
1
CF b K H ξ
η
⎛⎞
=+ − Λ + ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
and 
the absence of a pure wealth effect of fundamental housing wealth on aggregate consumption 
demand is confirmed. When housing is pure ‘land’, that is non-augmentable and indestructible, then 




CF b K H ξ
η
⎛⎞
=+ + ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. 
This makes it even clearer that in the model under consideration, a change in housing wealth affects 
consumption if and only if it is due to a change in the speculative bubble component of house prices. 
 
Qualifications of the housing wealth irrelevance result 
Wealth isn’t well being 
At the risk of belabouring the obvious, Proposition 1 says that a change in the fundamental 
value of a unit of housing does not lead to any change in consumption demand model.  However, 
since  () () () Rt tKt α = , a larger physical stock of housing capital increases equilibrium consumption 
of housing services raises utility - makes you better off.  Wealth (the value of your endowments) 
bears no obvious relation to utility in any case, as wealth values the infra-marginal units of assets at 
the marginal contribution to lifetime utility of the last unit: in a world without scarcity, all 
endowments would be valued at zero and wealth would be zero, but utility would be maximal.   
 16 
 
Changes in housing wealth due to a housing bubble 
Proposition 2 points out that when the change in the house price is due to a bubble rather 
than to a change in fundamental value, that is,  () 0 bt ≠  in equation (49), the change in house prices 
does represent a pure wealth effect.  Even if the economy is autarkic in housing, bubble-inclusive 
price of the house exceeds the value of their endowment of current and future housing services by 
the amount of the bubble.  Whether the housing market in the US or elsewhere has been 
characterised by a speculative bubble between, say, 2000 and 2007 is a hotly debated issue (see e.g. 
Case and Shiller (2003) and Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005)).  In the simple model of the 
paper, the marginal propensity to spend out of a change in house prices due to a change in the 
bubble component of the house price is the same as the marginal propensity to consume out of any 
other component of non-human or human wealth. 
 
Distributional effects, including intergenerational distribution 
In more general OLG models, especially those with systemic variations in household size 
over the life cycle and with age-dependent propensities to consume (among other reasons because 
remaining life expectancy is negatively related to age after some point), a decline in house prices 
redistributes wealth from those for whom the value of the housing stock they own is greater than the 
present discounted value of their future consumption of housing services to those for whom the 
value of the housing stock they own is less than the present discounted value of their future planned 
consumption of housing services.  That is, a house price decline redistributes wealth from 
homeowners to tenants.   
This means that the young, and all others planning to trade up in the housing market in the 
future will benefit from a decline in house prices.  The old and all others planning to trade down in 
the housing market in the future will lose when house prices fall.  The size or even the sign of the 
net effect on aggregate consumption demand of such redistributional changes are, as far as I know, 
not well established.  An Allais-Samuelson overlapping generations model is the natural vehicle for 17 
 
analyzing these intergenerational distributional effects. Other distributional effects can occur in 
open economies where the residents are tenants of non-resident landlords. 
 
Credit or collateral effects 
Finally, unlike human capital, housing wealth is collateralisable.  This means that 
households can borrow using the value of the homes they own as security.  Unsecured borrowing is 
more expensive than secured borrowing and may often not be possible on any terms.  With free 
labour (no slavery or indentured labour), future labour earnings cannot legally be collateralised and, 
unless reputational concerns are a powerful motivator, commitments to use future after-tax labour 
income to service unsecured debt may not be credible.  Housing wealth therefore permits credit 
constraints to be relaxed (see e.g. Hurst and Stafford (2004) and Klyuev and Mills (2006)).  A 
decline in house prices reduces the amount households can borrow (through ‘mortgage equity 
withdrawal’ or MEW).  Assuming that human wealth is not collateralisable at all, a simple way to 
bring the housing collateral role into the model of this paper is to introduce the further constraint on 
individual household optimisation that net financial wealth cannot be negative: 
 (, ) () (, )
k f tv p tktv −≤  (59) 
or, in the aggregate version: 
 () () ()
k Ft p tKt −≤  (60) 
This constrains net debt not to exceed the value of the housing stock.  If this constraint is 
binding, a fall in house prices will clearly lower aggregate consumption, regardless of whether 
housing price changes have a pure wealth effect. 
In his simulation of the effect of a house price decline on consumption and investment 
demand in the US, Mishkin (2007) captured this credit effect of a change in house prices by 
assigning to housing wealth twice the long-run marginal propensity to consume (0.076) than that 
assigned to other financial wealth (0.038).  This is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, because of the housing autarky argument, the model of this paper suggests that, 
without the collateral/credit effect, the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth would 18 
 
be zero, not 0.038.  At most therefore, Mishkin should, when he added the collateral effect to the 
benchmark FRB/US model, have assigned the value 0.038 to the marginal propensity to consume 
out of housing wealth, not 0.076. 
However, even 0.038 is likely to be an overestimate of the long-run marginal propensity to 
consume out of housing wealth.  The debt incurred through MEW has to be serviced.  Although 
current consumption will be higher as a result of a household’s ability to relax a borrowing 
constraint by increasing the size of its mortgage, the present discounted value of future consumption 
will have to be lower.  At market interest rates, the present discounted value of current and future 
consumption does not change as a result of a decline in house prices and the associated tightening 
of the credit constraint.  Modelling the credit effect of a house price decline properly would 
introduce it as a tightening of a borrowing constraint, but with the household’s intertemporal budget 
constraint satisfied both in the benchmark (with borrowing collateralised against property) and in 
the counterfactual simulation (with lower MEW).  It may not be easy to determine reliably when the 
consumption-reducing effect of increased debt service will kick in and dominate the consumption-
increasing effect of higher borrowing potential for a credit-constrained household, but to assume, as 
Mishkin does, that it never kicks in surely makes no sense.   
 
3. Conclusion 
  The value of a house is its fundamental value – the present discounted value of its future 
actual or imputed rentals – plus a speculative bubble component, if any.  A fall in house prices due 
to a change in its fundamental value redistributes wealth from those long housing (for whom the 
fundamental value of the house they own exceeds the present discounted value of their planned 
future consumption of housing services) to those short housing (from whom the fundamental value 
of the house they own is less than the present discounted value of their planned future consumption 
of housing services.  In a closed economy representative agent model and in the Yaari-Blanchard 19 
 
OLG model used in the paper, there is no pure wealth effect on consumption from a change in 
house prices if this represents a change in their fundamental value. 
  There is a pure wealth effect on consumption from a change in house prices if this reflects a 
change in the bubble component of house prices. 
  Two other channels, not considered in the formal model, through which a fall in house 
prices can affect aggregate consumption are (1) redistribution effects if the marginal propensity to 
spend out of wealth is different between those long housing (the old, say) and those short housing 
(the young, say) and (2) collateral or credit effects due to the collateralisability of housing wealth 
and the non-collateralisability of human wealth.  A decline in house prices reduces the scope for 
mortgage equity withdrawal.  For given sequences of future after-tax labour income and interest 
rates, this may depress consumption in the short run while boosting it in the long run. 20 
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